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Towards a Visual Middle Voice:  
Crisis, Dispossession, and Spectrality in Spain’s Hologram Protest  
 
There is perhaps no other word that dominates newspaper headlines, newscasts, and 
political rhetoric in contemporary Europe more than “crisis.” The omnipresence of 
‘crisis’ is not a novel phenomenon. According to Reinhart Koselleck, the idea of crisis, 
especially since the second half of the eighteenth century, becomes the “structural 
signature” of modernity.1 Yet, since the start of the new millennium, the feeling of living 
in crisis has been amplified: the fear of others in the West since the attacks on September 
11, 2001, the fear of terrorism that has been exacerbated in Europe in light of recent 
attacks, the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, the Eurozone crisis, the Greek debt 
crisis, and the ongoing refugee crisis since 2015, have forged a ubiquitous climate of 
crisis. This sense of crisis has been instrumentalized to legitimize states of emergency 
and repressive politics, anti-immigration policies, practices of biopolitical control, 
restrictions to citizens’ rights, and austerity politics. “The concept ‘crisis’,” Giorgio 
Agamben said in an interview, is now “a motto of modern politics, and for a long time it 
has been part of normality in any segment of social life.”2  
For the ancient Greeks, the term ‘crisis’ (κρίσις/krísis) functioned in the domains 
of law, medicine, and theology, where it designated “choices between stark alternatives—
right or wrong, salvation or damnation, life or death.”3 In the classical Greek context, 
                                                
1 Reinhart Koselleck. “Crisis.” Trans. Michaela W. Richter. Journal of the History of Ideas 67.2 (2006), pp. 
357-400, p. 372. 
2 Giorgio Agamben. “The Endless Crisis As an Instrument of Power: In Conversation with Giorgio 
Agamben.” Verso Blog (June 4, 2013). n.pag. <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1318-the-endless-crisis-
as-an-instrument-of-power-in-conversation-with-giorgio-agamben>. Accessed June 16, 2016. The original 
interview was published in German with the title “Die endlose Krise ist ein Machtinstrument” in 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (May 24, 2013). 
3 Koselleck. “Crisis” (note 1), p. 358. This applies to classical Greece, the Hellenistic era, early Christian 
and Roman contexts. 
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crisis signified both an “objective crisis” (a decisive point “that would tip the scales,” 
particularly in politics) and “subjective critique” (a judgment in the sense of “criticism” 
but also in the juridical sense of “trial” or “legal decision”). Crisis as judgment assumes a 
theological dimension in the Greek translation of the Bible: as God becomes the judge of 
his people, the term is invested with the “promise of salvation” but also with “apocalyptic 
expectations” in the “Final Judgment” (Τελική Κρίσις/Telikḗ Krísis).4  In the term’s 
medical meaning, crisis denoted both a medical condition (the illness) as well as the 
judgment about the illness (the diagnosis).5 
Τhese early meanings of crisis resonate in the term’s present uses. Nevertheless, 
our common understanding of crisis today deviates from the word’s original meaning in a 
decisive way. While crisis signified judgment and decision, “the present understanding of 
crisis,” Agamben says, “refers to an enduring state,” “extended into the future, 
indefinitely,” but “divorced from the idea of resolution.”6 “Today crisis,” Agamben 
continues, “has become an instrument of rule. It serves to legitimize political and 
economic decisions that in fact dispossess citizens and deprive them of any possibility of 
decision.”7 Like coffee without caffeine, this understanding of crisis is deprived of its 
defining feature—choice and decision.  
This withholding of choice is demonstrated by uses of the crisis rhetoric to 
promote “a politics without an alternative, a politique unique”8, exemplified by the so-
called ‘TINA doctrine’ (acronym for “There Is No Alternative”)—a slogan first used in 
the early 1990s by Thatcher and other politicians to indicate the lack of an alternative 
model to neoliberalism. As political philosopher Athena Athanasiou puts it,  
 
Through the doctrine of TINA (“There Is No Alternative”), neoliberalism is 
established as the only rational and viable mode of governance. Predicated upon 
this doctrine, discourses of crisis become a way to governmentally produce and 
manage (rather than deter) the crisis. “Crisis” becomes a perennial state of 
                                                
4 Ibid., pp. 358-360. 
5 Ibid., p. 360. 
6 Agamben. “The Endless Crisis As an Instrument of Power” (note 2), n.pag. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Alain Badiou. The Century. Cambridge, UK/Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007, p. 4. 
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exception that turns into a rule and common sense and thus renders critical 
thinking and acting redundant, irrational, and ultimately unpatriotic.9  
 
A contemporary implementation of this doctrine is palpable, for example, in the context 
of the Eurozone crisis, during which austerity politics in Greece, Spain, and other crisis-
stricken countries were defended in dominant rhetoric as a ‘one-way street’ without 
alternative.10  
As a legitimizing mechanism for a doctrine of ‘no alternatives,’ crisis rhetoric 
tends to rely on distinctions between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ that often turn political 
decisions into pseudo-choices between a legitimate and an illegitimate (even 
catastrophic) alternative. This binary logic also pervades the ways subjects are cast in this 
rhetoric as either active or passive, guilty or innocent, masters or victims. In a previous 
article, I showed how this logic takes shape in constructions of the Greek subject in 
moralizing narratives on the Greek debt crisis: as either guilty and responsible for their 
country’s plight due to ‘bad conduct’ or as passive, impotent victims of a corrupt political 
system and of structural forces beyond their control.11 The rhetorical reliance on the 
oppositions of passive/active or victims/perpetrators extends to several contexts of ‘crisis’ 
in Europe today, as I will show. Against the backdrop of the crisis rhetoric and the 
monologic narratives and dualistic distinctions it produces, the need for alternative forms 
of expression is amplified. In this article, I make a case for the middle voice as an 
expressive modality that can introduce alternative ‘grammars’ of subjectivity and agency 
to those on which dominant crisis rhetoric hinges.  
As a distinct grammatical category in which the subject remains inside the action 
and is affected by it, the middle voice has vanished in modern languages. However, since 
the 1970s, poststructuralist thinkers have renewed interest in the middle voice by 
theorizing it as a discursive mode that unsettles dualisms and carries crucial implications 
                                                
9 Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou. Dispossession: The Political in the Performative. Cambridge, 
UK/Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013, p. 149. 
10 For the meanings and climate of crisis, as delineated in the first three paragraphs of this article, see Maria 
Boletsi. “The Unbearable Lightness of Crisis: (Anti-)Utopia and Middle Voice in Sotiris Dimitriou’s Close 
to the Belly.” Greece in Crisis: The Cultural Politics of Austerity. Ed. Dimitris Tziovas. London/New York: 
I.B. Tauris 2017, pp. 259-261. 
11 Cf. Maria Boletsi. “From the Subject of the Crisis to the Subject in Crisis: Middle Voice on Greek 
Walls.” The Journal of Greek Media & Culture 2.1 (2016), pp. 3-28, esp. pp. 8-11. 
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for subject constitution. Building on a previous article, in which I explored mobilizations 
of the middle voice in wall-writings in Greece since the onset of the Greek crisis, here I 
explore the possibility of a visual middle voice as a critical response to crisis rhetoric.12 
To that end, I center on a peculiar public protest in front of the Spanish Parliament 
in Madrid in April 2015, opposing a (then) newly introduced Spanish law—the  “Law of 
Citizen Security”—which significantly restricted the citizens’ freedom of assembly and 
expression in the name of security and crisis-management. Unlike any other protest, this 
one was not carried out by actual people, but by holographic projections of protesters. 
This ‘hologram protest’ put forward a form of dispossession, whereby bodies asserted 
presence in public space through their absence. Unsettling the boundaries between fiction 
and reality, materiality and immateriality, power and impotence, past and present, the 
protest fostered a spectral space that functioned as a visual analogue of the middle voice. 
The spectral subjectivity that this ‘ghost march’ enacted, both underscored and 
challenged politically induced conditions of dispossession and precarity, revealing forms 
of agency that can spring through and against these conditions. As a result, the protest 
recast crisis as a critical threshold from which alternative narratives of the present and the 
future can emerge. 
 
1. Crisis Rhetoric and Subjectivity 
The politics of ‘no alternative’ was a product of the political climate following the end of 
the Cold War. As Western neoliberal capitalism, led by the U.S., established its global 
hegemony, several liberal thinkers welcomed this professed post-political era in which 
there would be no need for alternatives, as the best possible model, it seemed, had 
acquired license to rule globally. In the West today, after two collapsed towers, major 
riots, terrorist attacks, financial crises, and the ongoing refugee crisis, this liberal 
optimism would not stand ground. Yet, to a large extent, dominant political rhetoric in 
Europe seeks to sustain the TINA-doctrine. The neoliberal model may not carry the 
optimism it did in the early 1990s, but crisis rhetoric tends to cast any alternative as a 
catastrophic option, thereby deterring contestations of the current model. As Chantal 
                                                
12 The present article draws from, and extends, the theoretical framework developed in Boletsi. “From the 
Subject of the Crisis to the Subject in Crisis” (note 11), pp. 3-28. 
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Mouffe argues, this mode of thinking also affects many people on the left, who  
 
are beginning to doubt the possibility of an alternative to the neoliberal model 
which has been the driving force in the construction of the EU. The EU is 
increasingly perceived as being an intrinsically neoliberal project that cannot be 
reformed. Because it appears futile to try to transform its institutions, the only 
solution that remains is to exit. Such a pessimistic view is, no doubt, the result of 
the way in which all attempts to challenge the prevalent neoliberal rules are 
presented as anti-European attacks on the very existence of the Union.13  
 
Criticizing the monologic discourse of neoliberalism or proposing alternatives is usually 
equaled to Euroscepticism or anti-Europeanism, Mouffe observes. Many critiques of the 
current political model in the EU are indeed integrated in Euroscepticist and nationalistic 
restorative projects, with the Brexit campaign in the UK as a striking example. Mouffe 
therefore pleads for creating conditions that would allow democratic contestations of the 
neoliberal hegemony within the EU without abandoning the project of the European 
Union.14  
Crisis rhetoric may facilitate the minimization of political dissent and choice in 
contemporary politics, yet it certainly does not deter judgment—another meaning of 
“crisis” in Greek. On the contrary, to use a telling example, popular rhetoric on the Greek 
debt crisis in Greece and Western Europe largely revolves around the passing of 
judgment through finger-pointing.15  Debates about the causes of this crisis in the 
international and Greek media regularly took the form of a “blame-game”—a catchphrase 
widely employed by politicians and journalists in this context. Popular narratives of the 
crisis in Greece and the Eurozone may disagree on the identity of the guilty. But despite 
their differing crisis (judgment), they usually cast the Greeks either as responsible for 
their country’s dire state due to their faulty, unreliable character and habits or, to a lesser 
                                                
13 Chantal Mouffe. “An Agonistic Approach to the Future of Europe.” New Literary History 43.4 (2012), 
pp. 629-640, p. 637. 
14 Ibid., p. 638. 
15 For this practice of finger-pointing and literary responses to it, see Boletsi. “The Unbearable Lightness of 
Crisis” (note 10), pp. 261-263. 
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extent, as passive victims of either the shortcomings of the Greek state or the Eurozone, 
or of the violent forces of neoliberal capitalism. Narratives of this crisis were often 
divided between these two accounts of the subject as either the origin and cause of its 
own suffering due to bad conduct or the disempowered victim of external forces. These 
accounts drew from conventional accounts of subjectivity: the former was premised on 
the notion of the sovereign, autonomous, self-defining liberal subject and the latter on a 
notion of the subject as determined and conditioned by social or historical forces.16 
Popular rhetoric on the Eurozone crisis favored clear-cut distinctions between 
perpetrators and victims, guilty and innocent, or—echoing the medical meaning of 
crisis—doctors and sick patients (the latter being the crisis-stricken Southern European 
countries, or so-called “PIGS”).17 Such polarizing hierarchical pairs worked to widen the 
rift between the European North and South. However, the reliance of crisis rhetoric on 
monolithic notions of subjectivity along the lines of active/passive extends well beyond 
the context of the Greek or the Eurozone crisis, marking the discursive framing of several 
recent phenomena that are cast as ‘crises.’ Another case in point is the European rhetoric 
on migrants and refugees, especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ broke out in 2015, with 
millions of people from Syria, but also Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sub-Saharan Africa having 
to flee their countries and trying to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean. 
Refugees are constructed either as active agents or as passive victims, leaving little room 
for more complex subject positions. When projected as active agents, the implication is 
that they are potentially dangerous to European societies. When framed as helpless 
victims, they appear in need of saving and devoid of agency.  
The recent rekindling of the figure of the barbarian invasions in references to 
refugees storming the ‘gates’ of Europe exemplifies their framing as active—and 
threatening—agents. Comparisons between the fall of the Roman Empire and the current 
refugee influx do not only figure regularly in the press, but are also issued by prominent 
European politicians. In September 2015, President of the French National Front (FN) 
party Marine Le Pen likened the refugee crisis to a threatening “migrant invasion” like 
                                                
16 Cf. Boletsi. “From the Subject of the Crisis to the Subject in Crisis” (note 11), pp. 8-11. 
17 The acronym PIGS stands for Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain. 
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those of the fourth century18 and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte called in November 
2015 for protecting Europe’s borders in order to avoid a downfall similar to Rome’s.19 In 
both statements, Syrian refugees fleeing a devastating civil war were constructed as 
potentially destructive agents through a comparison with Rome’s invaders. 20  Such 
comparisons exacerbate the sense of living in crisis and under the threat of imminent 
attacks.  
Attempts to counter such stereotypical portrayals of refugees have certainly also 
claimed a place in public debates. Yet such attempts often replace the vocabulary of the 
active (and potentially dangerous) subject with a conception of subjectivity in the passive 
voice, which, by removing the threatening dimension, invalidates the agency of these 
others. In a July 2015 issue, the German magazine Der Spiegel used a series of six 
different covers, each figuring a portrait of a refugee, in an attempt to foreground the 
issue of Germany’s reception of refugees. By giving refugees a face, these covers aimed 
to counter the fear of others and the negative bias against refugees in Germany in light of 
the increase in the number of refugees seeking asylum in the country. The problem the 
magazine addressed was xenophobia, as we read in the cover’s subtitle: “Fremdenhass 
vergiftet Deutschland” (Hate for foreigners poisons Germany). The six refugee portraits 
on the cover were framed by titles that contrasted stereotypes (explicitly questioned 
through the use of a question mark) with the (suggested) truth behind those stereotypes: 
“Habgierig? Hungrig” (Greedy? Hungry); “Ungebildet? Unterdrückt” (Uneducated? 
Oppressed); “Bedrohlich? Bedroht” (Threatening? Threatened); “Kriminell? Verfolgt” 
(Criminal? Hunted); “Gefährlich? Gepeinigt” (Dangerous? Tormented); “Raffgierig? 
Arm” (Greedy? Poor).21  
                                                
18 Le Pen qtd. in Marc de Boni. “Marine Le Pen compare la crise des migrants à la chute de l’empire 
romain.” Le Figaro (Sept 15, 2015), n.pag. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-
scan/citations/2015/09/15/25002-20150915ARTFIG00111-marine-le-pen-compare-la-crise-des-migrants-a-
la-chute-de-l-empire-romain.php>. Accessed Aug 30, 2016. 
19 Pieter Spiegel. “Refugee Influx Threatens Fall of EU, Warns Dutch PM.” Financial Times (Nov 26, 
2015), n.pag. <https://www.ft.com/content/659694fe-9440-11e5-b190-291e94b77c8f >. Accessed Aug 20, 
2016. 
20 For a discussion of these statements and the rekindling of the barbarian invasions narrative in the West, 
see Maria Boletsi.  “Crisis, Terrorism, and Post-Truth: Processes of Othering and Self-Definition in the 
Culturalization of Politics.” Subjects Barbarian, Monstrous, and Wild: Encounters in the Arts and 
Contemporary Politics. Ed. by Maria Boletsi and Tyler Sage. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2018, pp. 17-50, p. 18. 
21 From the covers of Der Spiegel 31 (July 25, 2015). My translation from the German.  
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In nearly all these contrasts that were framed as ‘misconception versus truth,’ the 
first terms are indicative of active, autonomous subjects that should either be feared 
(“threatening,” “criminal,” “dangerous”) or morally despised (“greedy”). Without 
exception, the second terms sketch passive subjects in need: most of these terms are past 
participles that imply a passive voice construction (oppressed, threatened, hunted, 
tormented). The grammar and semantic content of these terms dictates that these are 
passive subjects, not responsible for their plight, but also not able to act autonomously in 
order to change their fate. They thus need to be helped and saved. In this binary scheme 
of subjectivity that follows the grammar of the active versus passive voice, alternative 
frameworks of understanding through different grammars of subjectivity are precluded. 
Therefore, even attempts to overturn negative stereotypes, commendable as they may be, 
are often restricted by the distinctions of the dominant crisis rhetoric. 
By discussing differentiated contexts and challenges in contemporary Europe 
under the rubric of “crisis rhetoric,” my intent is not to collapse the particularities of these 
contexts by reducing them to interchangeable illustrations of the same phenomenon. 
However, insofar as the concept ‘crisis’ forms an overarching framework that envelops 
different aspects of our political and social realities today, juxtaposing the mobilizations 
of ‘crisis’ in the above-discussed contexts may help untangle the overlapping discursive 
premises in diverse manifestations of crisis rhetoric. European crisis rhetoric may take 
different shapes, but my hypothesis is that it largely assigns subject positions following 
the modality of either the active or the passive voice. In the following, I explore 
alternative conceptualizations of the subject inspired by the mode of the middle voice, 
which confounds distinctions between passive and active or mastery and victimhood.  
 
2. Middle Voice: From a Grammatical Category to a Mode of Discourse22 
In his study of the middle voice in 1950, Émile Benveniste argued that the triple division 
in ancient Greek between passive/middle/active was premised on an earlier distinction 
between active and middle, with the passive voice being just a modality of the middle 
voice. The basis for this distinction was the relation between the subject and the process 
                                                
22 The exposition of the middle voice in this section is drawn from Boletsi. “From the Subject of Crisis to 
the Subject in Crisis” (note 11), pp. 11-13 (here slightly modified and abridged). 
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designated by the verb: in the active, the process is accomplished outside the subject, 
while in the middle, the subject is inside the process and affected by it.23 Although the 
middle voice as a grammatical category has disappeared in most modern languages, 
theorists such as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Hayden White, and Dominick 
LaCapra conceptualized a discursive analogue of the middle voice, exploring its 
theoretical potential in relation to active and passive constructions. 
 In the writings of Barthes, Derrida, and White, the middle voice denotes an area 
of undecidability that resists binary oppositions, such as those between transitive and 
intransitive or active and passive.24 In Derrida, the middle voice is inextricable from his 
notion of différance: it is the operation repressed by the opposition of the active and the 
passive voice, and, by extension, the in-between that any conceptual binary represses:  
 
in the usage of our language the ending -ance remains undecided between the 
active and the passive. And we will see why that which lets itself be designated 
différance is neither simply active nor simply passive, announcing or rather 
recalling something like, the middle voice, saying an operation that is not an 
operation, an operation that cannot be conceived either as passion or as the action 
of a subject on an object, or on the basis of the categories of agent or patient, 
neither on the basis of nor moving toward any of these terms. For the middle 
voice, a certain non-transitivity, may be what philosophy, at its outset, distributed 
into an active and a passive voice, thereby constituting itself by means of this 
repression.25 
 
If Western metaphysics has repressed the grammar of the middle voice by redistributing 
it into active and passive constructions, thinkers like Derrida rekindled it as a theoretical 
and political concept. As LaCapra writes, “[t]he middle voice would thus be the ‘in-
                                                
23 Émile Benveniste. “Active and Middle Voice in the Verb.” Problems in General Linguistics. Trans. 
Mary Elizabeth Meek. Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1971, p. 148; and Vincent Pecora. 
“Ethics, Politics, and the Middle Voice.” Yale French Studies 79 (1991), pp. 203-230, p. 210. 
24 Dominick LaCapra. Writing History, Writing Trauma, Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2001, p. 20. 
25 Jacques Derrida. Margins of Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, 
p. 9. 
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between’ voice of undecidability and the unavailability or radical ambivalence of clear-
cut oppositions.”26 The “zone of indetermination” that the middle voice fosters pertains to 
the distinction between passive and active, but also, as Agamben shows, to the relation 
“between subject and object,” since “the agent is in some way also object and place of 
action.”27 This raises the question of agency: if the middle voice hinders a clear-cut 
assignation of passive or active positions and even obscures the subject-object distinction, 
where does agency in speech lie, and how can we assign responsibility for words or 
actions?   
In Benveniste’s account of the middle voice, Vincent Pecora observes, “the 
crucial grammatical issue is where agency is located with reference to process.”28 In the 
middle voice, Benveniste writes, “the subject is the center as well as the agent of the 
process, he achieves something which is being achieved in him.”29 Not all linguists, 
however, endorse this emphasis on the subject as agent in the middle voice. The primary 
meaning of the Indo-European middle voice, Jan Gonda claims, was to render an “event 
which occurs with respect to, rather than because of, the entity encoded as subject”; an 
event, that is, that usually does not result “from the subject’s volitional effort” and 
involves “a non-agent subject.”30 The subject, in other words, participates in, and is 
affected by the event, but is not necessarily the agent causing it.  
In his critical response to Barthes’ account of the middle voice, Jean-Pierre 
Vernant relates the disappearance of the middle voice in the West with the evolution in 
Western thinking of “the idea of the human subject as agent, the source of actions, 
creating them, assuming them, carrying responsibility for them;” this “category of the 
will” and the “idea of the agent being the source of his action” is missing from thought in 
Greek and ancient Indo-European languages that use the middle voice.31 Thus, if many 
                                                
26 LaCapra. Writing History, Writing Trauma (note 24), p. 20. 
27 Giorgio Agamben. The Use of Bodies. Trans. Adam Kotsko. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015, 
p. 28. 
28 Vincent Pecora. “Ethics, Politics, and the Middle Voice” (note 23), p. 211. 
29 Benveniste. “Active and Middle Voice in the Verb” (note 23), p. 149; also qtd. in Pecora. “Ethics, 
Politics, and the Middle Voice” (note 23), p. 211. 
30 Gonda presented in Linda J. Manney. Middle Voice in Modern Greek: Meaning and Function of an 
Inflectional Category. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2000, p. 23. 
31 Vernant’s response to Barthes, included in Roland Barthes. “To Write: An Intransitive Verb?” The 
Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man. Ed. by Richard Macksey 
and Eugenio Donato. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972, pp. 134-156, p. 152. 
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linguists see middle voice constructions as effacing agency, this may be because they 
subscribe to a Western conception of agency as the intentional action of a willing subject. 
The middle voice, however, may enable other forms of agency, which challenge the idea 
of the sovereign subject as the origin and cause of its actions.  
 
3. Ghost March 
On April 10, 2015, a demonstration took place in front of the Spanish Parliament in 
Madrid. Instead of people, the protest was held by holographic projections of protesters, 
constituting the first virtual protest in history. This ‘ghost march’ was organized by “No 
Somos Delito” (We Are Not Crime), a platform comprising over one hundred 
associations, including lawyers, migrant rights groups, environmental and human rights 
organizations, and several groups associated with the 15-M movement in Spain. The 15-
M, also known as the Indignados Movement, emerged in 2011 from the social discontent 
following the financial crisis in Spain. The movement opposed the government’s anti-
austerity policies through large-scale protests and occupations of public spaces as well as 
through digital platforms and social media.32 In March 2015, the ruling People’s party in 
Spain passed the so-called “Law of Citizen Security” in an attempt to limit public protest 
and consolidate control of public space. The hologram protest was directed against this 
law, which restricted the people’s rights of freedom of assembly and expression. The law 
imposed exorbitant fines for disseminating images or videos of law enforcement officers 
during protests, for unauthorized protests near key infrastructure, and for convening near 
government buildings, making it illegal to assemble or demonstrate in front of such 
buildings without permission from authorities.33 The law was pejoratively dubbed “Ley 
Mordaza” (Gag Law) by its critics and was widely condemned within Spain and 
internationally. 
“No Somos Delito” (NSD) carried out the hologram demonstration with the 
support of a media professionals, which saw the new law as part of the government’s 
                                                
32 See Almudena Escobar López. “Invisible Participation: The Hologram Protest in Spain.” Afterimage 43.4 
(2016), pp. 8-11, p. 8. 
33 For an outline of the sanctions this law involved, see Ashifa Kassam. “Spain Puts ‘Gag’ on Freedom of 
Expression As Senate Approves Security Law.” The Guardian (March 12, 2015), n.pag. 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/spain-security-law-protesters-freedom-expression >. 
Accessed June 10, 2017. 
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attempt to limit democratic freedoms, criminalize protest, and control the movement of 
bodies in public space. For months before the protest, NSD run the website “Holograms 
for Freedom” (hologramasporlalibertad.org), where people could upload written 
comments, voice-messages, or images of their faces, many of which were later 
incorporated in the protest that was filmed and projected. About 18.000 people left a 
hologram image or message on the website.34 The protest was filmed in a small town 
close to Madrid, and on April 10, 2015, the protesters were projected as holograms in 
front of the Parliament. Members of the press taking interviews from NSD activists also 
appeared in real time as holograms on another screen.35  
The “Gag Law” exemplifies the instrumentalization of ‘crisis’ as a means of 
minimizing critique. The governmentality of ‘crisis,’ which legitimizes authoritarian 
measures and securitarian power, enabled such a law to pass under the name “Law of 
Citizen Security.” If “the discourse of ‘crisis’ is already a way to ‘manage’ the crisis,”36 
this law was a sovereign gesture aimed at foreclosing dissent by (quite literally) closing 
the space in which dissent could take place. Outsmarting this attempt, the hologram 
protest used a new hybrid discourse in mixed media (image, language, sound) to 
introduce a spectral subjectivity, in-between the real and the fictional, presence and 
absence, which turned dispossession—as holographic subjects are dispossessed of their 
bodies—into a form of political agency.  
 
4. Between Fiction and Reality 
The authorities only allowed this protest to take place because it was announced as a 
film-shoot by NSD, not as a public demonstration; hence, a representation of a protest, 
framed as film, art, fiction. As Cristina Flesher Fominaya, spokesperson for NSD, stated, 
“[w]e were only able to do it because we got a film shoot permit. Protesting in front of 
                                                
34 López. “Invisible Participation” (note 32), pp. 9-10; Cristina Flesher Fominaya and Andrea Teti. “Spain’s 
Hologram Protests.” Open Democracy (April 22, 2015), n.pag. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-
europe-make-it/cristina-flesher-fominaya-andrea-teti/spain’s-hologram-protests>. Accessed June 10, 2017. 
35 López. “Invisible Participation” (note 32), p. 10. 
36 Butler in Butler and Athanasiou. Dispossession (note 9), p. 150. 
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parliament is forbidden [...] so a protest permit would not have worked.”37 The protest 
could only be realized under the guise of fiction.  
In J.L. Austin’s speech act theory, which explores the ability of language to 
perform acts through words, speech acts in fictional settings are considered non-serious 
and therefore not worth taking into account as instances of linguistic performativity. 
Austin famously excludes fiction from his theory:  
 
A performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if 
said by an actor on the stage, or introduced in a poem, or spoken in a soliloquy. 
[...] Language in such circumstances is in special ways—intelligibly—used not 
seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use […].38  
 
Extending this rationale to the visual realm, the representation of a protest in film would 
not be perceived as a serious act—i.e., an actual protest—just as an actor’s promise on 
stage, in Austin’s view, would not be a serious speech act. Austin’s use of the words 
“hollow” and “void” to describe fictional, non-serious acts finds ironic resonance in the 
holographic figures.  
The non-seriousness of literature and art as fictional modes of expression 
purportedly hollows out their political potential, making them less threatening to 
hegemonic power. The organizers of the protest capitalized on this preconception in order 
to ironize state discourse and circumvent its restrictions. If ‘serious’ activities (such as 
protests or assemblies) are prohibited, fiction (be it in literature, film or other art forms) 
retains its freedom—the freedom, to use Derrida’s phrasing, to “say everything” (“tout 
dire”) “in every way” or, in this case, to show everything.39 For Derrida, literature’s 
freedom gives it the power to “defy or lift the law” and thus allows “one to think the 
                                                
37 Flesher and Teti. “Spain’s Hologram Protests” (note 34), n.pag. 
38 J.L. Austin. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962, p. 22. 
39 Jacques Derrida. “This Strange Institution Called Literature: An Interview with Jacques Derrida.” 
Jacques Derrida. Acts of Literature. Ed. Derek Attridge. New York and London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 33-
75, p. 36. 
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essence of the law.”40 Using this freedom to defy the state’s new legislation, the protest 
addressed the ways this law curtailed democratic freedoms.  
Derrida acknowledges that literature’s freedom is double-edged: a “powerful 
political weapon but one which might immediately let itself be neutralized as a fiction. 
This revolutionary power can become very conservative.”41 The ability of literature and 
art to intervene in political and social realities can be mitigated due to their fictional 
status—their non-seriousness. The hologram protest’s differing reception by local and 
international media reflects this double-edged political potential of fiction. In the Spanish 
media the event did not attract much attention; when it was covered, the media reduced 
its significance “by transforming it into a minor entertainment anecdote.”42 Without 
addressing its critical or political content, they focused on its technical innovation and its 
entertainment value as a spectacle.43 However, international media covered it extensively 
as a political intervention: “It was on the front page of Le Monde as ‘The Story of the 
Day,’ in the Independent and the New Yorker, and on CNN” and the event’s coverage 
sparked international criticism of Spain’s new law: “On April 16, the Boston Globe 
published an editorial claiming ‘Virtual speech trumps Spain’s gag law,’ and the New 
York Times, on April 22, condemned ‘Spain’s Ominous Gag Law’.”44   
Dissenting bodies pushed out of public space found a mode of resistance in 
fictionalizing themselves. Fiction, the abjected other of Austin’s theory, comes back with 
a vengeance to haunt ‘serious’ political rhetoric. The function of this fictionalization and 
spectralization of citizens’ bodies was distinct from that of the simulacrum in the 
meaning it has taken since Jean Baudrillard turned it into a hallmark of the postmodern 
era. Following Baudrillard’s famous thesis in Simulacres et Simulation (1981; Simulacra 
and Simulation), in the era of late capitalism simulacra stand on their own without 
reference to an original or any relationship to reality, thus invalidating the distinction 
between representation and reality.45 By contrast, the holograms did not pose as signs 
without original; in fact, they drew attention to the bodies that were banned from 
                                                
40 Ibid., p. 36. 
41 Ibid., p. 38. 
42 López. “Invisible Participation” (note 32), p. 10. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 See Jean Baudrillard. Simulacres et Simulation. Paris: Galilée, 1981. 
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participation. Instead of obliterating the line between the real and fictional or the object 
and its representation, they confounded it, but only to illuminate its exclusionary 
workings. By blurring this line without erasing it, they re-politicized the fictional by 
emphasizing its difference from the real.  
 
5. Dispossession and Spectrality 
Using fiction’s exclusion from the state’s restrictions, the hologram demonstration 
fostered a thirdspace of possible impossibilities, which emerged from a radical form of 
dispossession. In her theoretical delineation of dispossession, Judith Butler lays out this 
concept’s double meaning as an “existential category” and “a condition of induced 
inequality and destitution.”46 Dispossession captures an existential condition of not 
‘owning’ oneself, because the self is formed, as well as undone, by others. As such, it 
“marks the limits of self-sufficiency” and “establishes us as relational and interdependent 
beings.”47 But dispossession is also a condition of “enforced deprivation of rights, land, 
livelihood, desire or modes of belonging.”48 In the framework of neoliberal capitalism 
and “economic precarity,” dispossession pertains to “the wearing out of laboring and 
non-laboring bodies” through unemployment, “temporary, low-paying, and insecure 
jobs” or “cuts to welfare provision.”49 Dispossessed individuals are deprived of their 
rights, jobs, dignity; they are impoverished, marginalized, disenfranchised people or 
supernumerary bodies not recognized as citizens, such as illegal migrants leading spectral 
lives. Enforced dispossession entails a form of “non-being:”50 it makes people disposable, 
valueless, indebted, exploited, vulnerable to injury, illegal. 
Even though enforced dispossession is disempowering, Butler puts forward the 
notion of the “dispossessed subject” as a challenge to the sovereign subject, exploring its 
potential in forms of resistance to today’s governmentality of crisis. In their dialogical 
study Dispossession: The Performative in the Political (2013), Butler and Athanasiou 
                                                
46 Butler in Butler and Athanasiou. Dispossession (note 9), p. 20. Butler uses these descriptions to convey 
the double sense of the notion of precarity, but they also apply to the way she casts the ambivalent meaning 
of dispossession. 
47 Ibid., p. 3. 
48 Athanasiou in ibid. p. 5. 
49 Ibid., p. 11. 
50 Ibid., p. 19. 
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focus on acts of bodily resistance to enforced dispossession. When faced with “pervasive 
forms of socially assigned disposability” and with the impossibility of being constituted 
as a legitimate subject within a political and social order, “the only resistance,” Butler 
writes, is “a practice of de-instituting the subject itself.”51 Bodily dispossession as a mode 
of resistance can take extreme forms, as in cases of public self-immolation, suicides or 
hunger strikes. “Dispossessing oneself”—in extreme cases, culminating in actual death—
becomes “a way to dispossess coercive powers” and to expose the inhumanity of the 
machinery that imposes conditions of precarity.52  
In the hologram protest both understandings of dispossession are at work. On the 
one hand, Spanish citizens protested as disembodied ghost-like images of themselves, 
underlining processes of enforced dispossession resulting from economic precarity and 
incursion into citizens’ freedoms. On the other hand, the hologram projected 
dispossession—as the expropriation of one’s body—as a means of resistance to these 
processes. Fostering a spectral subjectivity in response to enforced dispossession, the 
protest countered the expulsion of dissenting bodies from public space.  
The mobilization of spectrality as a form of dispossession differs from most cases 
that Butler and Athanasiou consider exemplary of the “subversive potentiality of 
dispossessed subjectivities” in resisting the “governmentality of crisis.”53 Whereas Butler 
and Athanasiou draw attention to the use of bodies as a “resource for political power,”54 
the hologram protest unravels a reverse process: the body is not there as an instrument of 
resistance, yet it asserts a forceful indexical presence.  
The body’s spectral presence in the protest propels a rethinking of presence and 
agency by delinking both concepts from the metaphysics of presence. In Western 
capitalist modernity, presence, Athanasiou writes, seems inextricable from “the 
metaphysical conceits of self-identity, self-sufficiency, and self-transparency.”55 In this 
context, “being and having are […] ontologically imbricated with each other” and cannot 
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52 Athanasiou in ibid., p. 146. 
53 Ibid., p. 140. 
54 Ibid., p. 145. 
55 Ibid., p. 14. 
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be thought apart.56 However, one can foster ways of “being present to one another” “in 
ways not assimilated or submitted to the ontological presuppositions of normative 
authoritarian self-presence.”57 Overriding having as a condition of being, the protesting 
holograms asserted a spectral subjectivity through the expropriation of one’s body. They 
turned dispossession into a mode of being-as-specter, dissociated from having and self-
presence. 
In the protest, the presence/absence of citizens’ bodies questioned a conventional 
understanding of presence as a prerequisite for intelligibility and agency in the political 
sphere. Drawing attention to the limits of the authoritative order of presence (according to 
which the state’s blocking of citizens’ physical presence would effect their 
disempowerment) these spectral bodies redefined what matters as ‘presence’ in public 
space. They introduced a liminal logic—the logic of the middle voice—that questioned 
the either/or logic of state law.  
 A specter is able to say “here I am” and “here I am not” at the same time: its 
‘and/and’ rather than ‘either/or’ logic brings this figure close to the modality of the 
middle voice. This partial self-negation allows for questioning the law, because it frees 
one from the imperative to affirm their subjectivity by submitting to the terms of 
hegemonic power. The spectralization of citizens’ bodies challenges the process of 
interpellation, which according to Louis Althusser functions as a restoration of self-
identity through the linguistic consolidation “here I am.” In Althusser’s well-known 
example of interpellation, the policeman hails a passerby, who then has to turn around 
and affirm his presence (“here I am”), purchasing his subjectivity through guilt and 
submission to ideology.58 The dispossessed subjectivity the holograms projected was a 
subversive literalization of practices of forced dispossession but also an enactment of 
subjectivity as dissociated from an affirmation of self-identity: if “I am not” can also be a 
way to be, then new possibilities arise for dispossessed subjects to reclaim agency in the 
political. The holograms pointed to a mode of being between presence and absence, 
identity and non-identity, which can be seen as a visual manifestation of a discourse in 
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the middle voice. If in the middle voice the subject is both agent and patient, the 
holographic protesters drew attention to this double potentiality of dispossessed subjects. 
The figure of the specter, mainly owing to the publication of Jacques Derrida’s 
Spectres de Marx (1993), has emerged since the 1990s as a powerful conceptual 
metaphor. The specter’s “liminal position between visibility and invisibility, life and 
death, materiality and immateriality” has been employed in the humanities to address 
questions concerning liminal identities, social change, and our relation to history and the 
past.59 I propose here a theoretical contiguity of the spectral and the middle voice, which 
may be worth exploring further. The hologram protest experimented with a spectral 
subjectivity that accommodates the kind of “competing epistemological […] positions”60 
that the middle voice enables: passive and active, present and absent, placed and 
displaced, real and fictional, serious and non-serious, projecting the subject’s power and 
impotence in the political sphere.  
 
6. Beyond the Body-Spirit Divide 
Considering the role of corporeality in the hologram protest is crucial for untangling its 
critical operations. The protest did not negate the body or render it irrelevant as an 
instrument of resistance. The spectral subjectivity this event effected was not an 
affirmation of the Cartesian subject as spirit without a body. Rather, the holograms 
asserted a form of bodily presence as and through absence. 
Bringing the notion of the specter to bear on the holograms does not diminish the 
involvement of the corporeal in their performance. Derrida distinguishes the specter from 
the spirit by posing that the former does not eschew corporeality: 
 
For there is no ghost, there is never any becoming specter of the spirit without at 
least the appearance of flesh, in a space of invisible visibility like the disappearing 
of an apparition. For the ghost, there must be a return to the body, but to a body 
that is more abstract than ever. The spectrogenic process corresponds therefore to 
                                                
59 Cf. The Spectralities Reader: Ghosts and Haunting in Contemporary Cultural Theory. Ed. by Maria Del 
Pilar Blanco and Esther Peeren. London/New York: Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 2. 
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a paradoxical incorporation […].61  
 
The specter for Derrida constitutes a form of embodiment: “a paradoxical incorporation, 
the becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and carnal form of the spirit.”62 “[F]lesh and 
phenomenality,” he writes, “give the spirit its spectral apparition” even though they 
“disappear right away in the apparition.”63 A liminal figure, the specter resists definition 
through existing vocabularies of being: it is “neither soul nor body, and both the one and 
the other.”64 As specters, the protesting holograms explored the conditions for spectral 
bodies to assert presence and agency in public space. The bodies that were filmed 
elsewhere and then projected outside the Spanish Parliament were present at a previous 
time and place. Their spectral projection marked their allochronic and heterotopic 
presence, stubbornly inscribing it in the here and now of the Spanish Parliament on April 
10, 2015. Their ‘being there’ carried within it a ‘being elsewhere’ and at another time, 
dirempting the continuity of time and space.  
 
7. Spectral Temporality  
In this disruption of linear temporality that the holograms occasioned, the convergence of 
spectrality with the middle voice becomes even more pronounced. The specter, Fredric 
Jameson argues, makes us aware of the fact that a self-sufficient notion of the present 
cannot exist.65 The present is never fully present or identical to itself, but always non-
contemporaneous with itself. Through their unpredictable appearance and disappearance, 
specters show how the identity of the present to itself is disjoined and how the past and 
future already inhabit the present. Specters from the past and the future occupy and 
produce the present, just as they as shaped by it. The specter yields a precarious present, 
but one that is also open to alternative futures, which cannot be predicted in advance.  
The spectral temporality of the hologram protest disrupted the narrative of the 
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future as a one-way street—so dominant in the crisis rhetoric—by triggering an 
incalculable interplay of past, present, and future. Divergent times and places converged 
in the protest’s ‘here and now.’ The traces of people that participated in the recording of 
the protest some days before in another town encountered the traces of people who left 
their images or shouts on the website of NSD. These spectral presences also conjured up 
specters of Franscisco Franco’s dictatorship, a repressive police state marked by severe 
restrictions of public space. Indeed, the restriction of citizens’ freedoms and of public 
space in Spain since the crisis in 2008 has been seen as “symptomatic” of “the traces left 
by Franco’s dictatorship.”66 The holograms also dragged the future into the present by 
projecting a dystopian scenario that contemporary political conditions could give rise to: 
a future in which citizens are replaced by holograms. These specters from the past and the 
future, superimposed on one another, yielded a present in crisis, more polyphonic than 
the monologism of crisis rhetoric.  
The middle voice produces a precarious present in which subjectivity is 
constituted in the ‘now.’ While in the active and passive voices the verb denotes a 
relation of temporal separation between the beginning and completion of the action, in 
the middle voice, as White argues following Barthes, “actions and their effects are 
conceived to be simultaneous; past and present are integrated rather than dirempted, and 
the subject and object of the action are in some way conflated.”67 Barthes traces this 
subject/object conflation in modernist writing, in which the writing subject is not 
“anterior to the process of writing” but “immediately contemporary with the writing.”68 
In the discourse of the middle voice, the subject does not pre-exist the verb’s act but is 
constituted through it. As a visual manifestation of the middle voice, the protest became 
an act of subject-constitution that triggered a crisis in the notions of subjectivity that the 
rhetoric of crisis favors. The holograms, albeit fictional, haunted and exposed the fiction 
of the autonomous, predetermined, self-sufficient subject by projecting a spectral 
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subjectivity, volatile but potent, coming into being temporarily, co-shaped by other past 
and future ‘presents.’ 
  
8. Recasting Crisis through the Middle Voice 
The potential of the middle voice for articulating alternative subjectivities and 
envisioning languages of critique beyond binary positions may clash with current uses of 
‘crisis,’ but it need not be at odds with the semantics of crisis as a concept. In both its 
ancient and modern history, crisis, Koselleck argues, creates the pressure of a decision 
between two mutually exclusive and “harsh dualistic alternatives.”69 Yet, despite the 
concept’s mobilization within an either/or logic, the semantic content of crisis 
 
always admits alternatives pointing not just to diametrically opposed possibilities, 
but also to those cutting across such opposites. It is precisely through the 
multiplicity of mutually exclusive alternatives that the various uses of the term 
may point to the existence of a real ‘crisis,’ even though it is not yet fully 
captured in any of the interpretations offered at that moment.70  
 
Crisis can potentially subvert the oppositional logic it serves, yielding multiple 
alternatives. It is this potential in the crisis-concept that the spectral as a visual analogue 
of the middle voice could bring to the fore. As the hologram protests suggest, the middle 
voice does not eliminate crisis as decision, but may reinvigorate the possibility of actual 
decision and critique, disrupting our understanding of crisis as a chronic impasse, one-
way-street or pseudo-decision between the existing state and a catastrophic alternative.  
The middle voice enables more complex subject positions than those dictated by 
the binaries between passive/active, victims/perpetrators, real/fictional. As a visual 
manifestation of the middle voice, the holograms gave shape to an expressive mode that 
allowed the articulation of subjectivities not fully intelligible within the vocabularies of 
the crisis rhetoric, triggering the imagination of alternative narratives for the future. 
                                                
69 Koselleck. “Crisis” (note 1), p. 370. Translation modified. 
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